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INTRODUCTION 
WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE? 
Justin Aaberg 
1995–2010 
Anoka, Minnesota 
 
Alexa Berman 
1994–2008 
Brookfield, Connecticut 
 
Ryan Halligan 
1990–2003 
Essex Junction, Vermont 
 
Brian Head 
1979–1994 
Woodstock, Georgia 
 
Kameron Jacobsen 
1997–2011 
Monroe, New York 
 
Jeffrey Johnston 
1990–2005 
Cape Coral, Florida 
 
Samantha Kelly 
1996 – 2010 
Huron Township, Michigan 
 
Jessica Laney 
1996–2012 
Hudson, Florida 
 
Jesse Logan 
1990–2008 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
 
Megan Taylor Meier  
1992–2006  
Dardenne Prairie, Missouri 
 
Rachael Neblett 
1989–2006 
Mount Washington, Kentucky 
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Alexis Skye Pilkington 
1993–2010 
West Islip, New York 
 
Phoebe Nora Mary Prince 
1994–2010 
South Hadley, Massachusetts 
 
Jamey Rodemeyer 
1997–2011 
Buffalo, New York 
 
Curtis Taylor 
1979–1993 
Burlington, Iowa 
 
Hope Witsell 
1996–2009 
Ruskin/Hillsborough, Florida 
 
These were school children, all under the age of eighteen, who died too young.  
These children were not shot down in their classrooms.  They did not overdose on 
illegal drugs.  They were not killed by drunk drivers.  These school children died as 
a result of actions committed by other school children—actions that could have been 
prevented by vigilant school administrators. 
Some may argue that this is an overly dramatic way to begin a law review article.   
Yet, we find that it is sometimes easy for “formal literature”—such as scholarly 
articles or legal opinions—to take too sterile and academic a view of life.  While 
academic “distance” may be conducive to clear-headed and logical analysis, it also 
puts a false emotional barrier between theories and the practical impacts that they 
ultimately have on real people.  We are guilty of this ourselves.  In early drafts of 
this article, the names you see above appeared as a footnote to the sentence: 
Media reports have described one tragic case after another of student 
bullying and cyber bullying leading to violence and suicides. 
Upon reflection, we were at first uncomfortable with, and finally ashamed by the 
fact that, in dealing with a topic as critical as cyber bullying and free speech, we had 
literally relegated the victims to a footnote.1 
                                                           
 1 Further information on these child victims can be found in the following 
references.  The first high profile case of cyber bullying appears to be that of Megan Meier: 
MySpace Mom Linked to Missouri Teen’s Suicide Being Cyber-Bullied Herself, FOX NEWS 
(Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,315684,00.html.  Numerous cases have 
been reported since then.  See Matt Gutman, ‘Text Rage’ Leads to Alleged Brutal Teen 
Beating, ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/text-rage-
leads-alleged-brutal-teen-beating/story?id=10148892 (describing teen that was almost beaten 
to death after flurry of text messages); Helen Kennedy, Phoebe Prince, South Hadley High 
School's 'New Girl,' Driven to Suicide by Teenage Cyber Bullies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 
2010 (describing a Massachusetts teen that committed suicide after being bullied; and the 
bullies were indicted); Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/29/earlyshow/main6343077.shtml 
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School climate is a concept that has been recognized and studied for over fifty 
years.2  It has been described metaphorically thus: “Personality is to the individual 
what climate is to the [school].”3  School climate consists of several elements: 
ecology, milieu, social system, and culture.4  It is important because schools do not 
merely teach academic subjects.  A critical part of the work of schools is 
socialization—inculcating traditions, customs and social mores in children.5  This 
task is accomplished didactically to be sure, but also by modeling—namely students 
follow the example of teachers and administrators—and by creating an environment, 
a climate, that is accepting and tolerant of appropriate conduct, while rejecting 
inappropriate conduct.  And, the Supreme Court has recognized that in dealing with 
school children, school administrators may prohibit and punish conduct that, in any 
other context done by any other citizen, would be afforded constitutional protection.6 
                                                           
(describing that after a teen’s suicide, taunts on social media sites continued); Andy Birkey, 
Mother of Suicide Victim Speaks Out on Bullying at Anoka-Hennepin, MN. INDEP., Sept. 14, 
2010, http://minnesotaindependent.com/64978/wcco-mother-justin-aaberg-lgbt-bullying-
anoka-hennepin (describing that teen committed suicide after anti-gay bullying); Greg Cergol, 
Teens Charged in Anti-Gay Bias Attack on L.I., NBC 4 N.Y. (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Teens-Charged-in-Anti-Gay-Bias-Attack-on-LI-
104950939.html (describing teens that were charged for bullying; a bus driver and monitor 
fail to report the incident as well); Rheana Murray, Cyber-Bullying, Social Media Blamed 
after Florida Teen Commits Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2012,; Bog Greene, Why 
Weren’t You His Friends, JEWISH WORLD REV.  (Mar. 19, 2001), http://www.jewishworld 
review.com/bob/greene031901.asp; Teens Who Have Committed Suicide After Being Bullied 
Online, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=130248877; Parents Speak Out on Bullying after Son’s Death, CBS NEWS (Sept. 15, 
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500172_162-20106690/parents-speak-out-on-bullying-
after-sons-death/; Sarah Anne Hughes, Jamey Rodemeyer, Bullied Teen Who Made ‘It Gets 
Better’ Video, Commits Suicide, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011. 
 2 See generally JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); Chris 
Argyris, Some Problems in Conceptualizing Organizational Climate: A Case Study of a Bank, 
2 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 501 (1958); Benjamin Schneider & C.J. Bartlett, Individual Differences in 
Organizational Climate, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 323 (1968). 
 3 ANDREW W. HALPIN & DON B. CROFT, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE OF SCHOOLS 1 
(1963); see also John I. Nwanko, The School Climate as a Factor in Students’ Conflict in 
Nigeria, 10 EDUC. STUD. 267 (1979). 
 4 Renato Taguiri, The Concept of Organizational Climate, in ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE: 
EXPLORATION OF A CONCEPT (Renato Taguiri & George H. Litwin eds., 1968). 
 5 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2008).  “Local school authorities have the 
difficult task of teaching ‘the shared values of a civilized social order’—values that include 
our veneration of free expression and civility, the importance we place on the right of dissent 
and on proper respect for authority.”  Id. (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)); 
see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. 2002). 
 6 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding individualized suspicion 
not required to support drug testing students to deter their drug use); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (rejecting probable cause requirement or need for warrants for school 
officials to search student); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (refusing to extend 
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment element to apply to corporal punishment of 
students); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring only minimal process for temporary 
disciplinary suspensions in schools). 
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One part of creating a positive school climate is teaching children to respect the 
rights of others.7  A symptom of the breakdown of this respect, familiar to anyone 
who has attended school, is bullying. 8  Bullying is nothing new.  Yet, due to the 
many tragic outcomes with which we began this Article, bullying, including the 
subset of bullying via electronic means referred to as cyber bullying,9 has recently 
received a great deal of attention from lawmakers and regulators. 10 
Forty-nine states have enacted bullying legislation in some form, many of which 
include language specifically aimed at preventing and addressing cyber bullying.11  
                                                           
 7 Robert White & Nasir Warfa, Building Schools of Character: A Case-Study 
Investigation of Character Education’s Impact on School Climate, Pupil Behavior, and 
Curriculum Delivery, 41 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 45, 57-58 (2011). 
 8 Bullying has been defined as “unwanted, aggressive behavior among school aged 
children that involves a real or perceived power imbalance.”  Bullying Definition, 
STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/what-is-bullying/definition/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 9 Unless otherwise stated in this Article, the term “bullying” is intended to include the 
subcategory of “cyber bullying.” 
 10 See sources cited supra note 1. 
 11 ALA. CODE § 16-28B-4 (LexisNexis 2012); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2013); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 15-341 (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (2012) (declaring that 
cyber bullying is punishable as Class B misdemeanor); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r) (Deering 
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2013); D.C. CODE § 5-B2502.3 (LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 1006.147 (LexisNexis 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 8-19-2, 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012) (declaring 
bullying criminal); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.7 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (West 2013); 
KAN. STAT.  ANN. §72-8256 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(proscribing as Class B misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:40.7 (2013) (criminally 
sanctioning cyber bullying but relegating offenders under the age of seventeen to Title VII of 
the Children’s Code for disposition); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 1001(15)(H) (2012); MD. 
CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.3 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O 
(LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 380.1310b (LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
160.775 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 388.122, 388.123, 388.135 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
193-F:3, 193-F:4 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-15, 18A:37-15.1 (West 
2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-21 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 11(7), 12 (Consol. 
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2013) (declaring cyber bullying criminal); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 15.1-19-17, 15.1-19-18 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22, 3313.666 
(LexisNexis 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 339.351, 399.356 (West 2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS 16-21-34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-120, 59-63-130 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 13-32-15, 13-32-16, 13-32-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1015, 49-6-1016 
(2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 
53A-11a-102-201 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11(a)(32) (2012); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 28A.300.285 (LexisNexis 2012); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-2, 18-2C-3 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-312, 21-4-313 (2012); see also Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, 
State Cyber-Bullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyber-Bullying Laws and Policies, 
CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.cyberbullying. 
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The United States Congress has proposed, but failed to enact, legislation that would 
criminally sanction cyber bullying.12 
The Department of Education has more aggressively entered the fray.  The Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR) addresses bullying and cyber bullying under the auspices of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.13  Since 2009, the OCR has maintained a 
national database14 containing reports of and responses to bullying and harassment 
on the bases of disability, race, and gender.15  The database allows web visitors to 
produce reports of bullying and harassment incidences aggregated at the state, 
district, and campus level. 
The issue of cyber bullying is more complicated from a legal perspective than 
“traditional” bullying.  Cyber bullying generally involves communication via 
electronic means.  Most such communications will, by their nature, constitute 
“speech” as that word is understood legally.  As a consequence, regulation of cyber 
bullying potentially raises First Amendment student free speech issues.  In addition, 
due to the ubiquity of electronic media, cyber bullying conduct which often 
originates off campus can easily make its way on campus, and potentially disrupt the 
learning environment and/or directly affect students in that environment.16  Free 
speech protections and the off campus/on campus issue are both concerns applicable 
to cyber bullying that are not necessarily implicated by traditional bullying.17 
                                                           
us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (cataloging cyber bullying statutes state by state).  
The only state currently lacking bullying legislation is the state of Montana.  Although no 
“bullying” law exists, the Montana Department of Justice makes it clear that bullying and 
cyber bullying activity is prohibited under many existing laws.  For Teens & Tweens: 
Cyberbullying, MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://doj.mt.gov/safeinyourspace/for-teens-tweens-
cyberbullying/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (defining cyber bullying and citing numerous 
Montana criminal provisions potentially implicated by wrongful conduct). 
 12 Bullying Prevention and Intervention Act of 2011, H.R. 83, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(introduced by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee on January 5, 2011, but died in committee). 
 13 Letter from Russlynn Ali, Asst. Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., to 
Colleague (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/coll 
eague-201010.pdf.  OCR also points out that the Department of Justice retains jurisdiction 
over bullying acts that implicate Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 1. 
 14 Civil Rights Data Collection, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 15 U. S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SY 2011-12 CRDC DEFINITIONS: PART 
1 AND PART 2 (2011), available at http://crdc.ed.gov/downloads/10%20SY%202011-
12%20CRDC%20Definitions.pdf.  
 16 James A. O'Shaughnessy, Is Cyber-Bullying the Next “Columbine”: Can New 
Hampshire Schools Prevent Cyber-Bullying and Avoid Liability?, 52 N.H.B.J. 42, 44 (2011) 
(citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 17 See Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children's Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. The 
Right to be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-Bullying,” 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 192 
(2011).  The rise of the Internet has created issues in other legal areas as well.  See Ashcroft v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (stating that the unique nature of Internet 
impacting application of community standards jurisprudence to that medium). 
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Cyber bullying has generally been dealt with by the courts using one of two legal 
analyses: the “true threats” doctrine, or the Tinker substantial disruption test.  This 
law review, the Cleveland State Law Review, recently published Anti-Cyber Bullying 
Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech18 (referred to herein as “the Threat to Speech 
article”), which addressed these two theories, and argued that the current evolution 
of cyber bullying legislation simply goes too far.  For example, Hayward states 
Anti-cyber bullying laws are the greatest threat to student speech because 
they seek to censor it anytime it occurs, using “substantial disruption” of 
school activities as justification and often based only on mere suspicion of 
potential disruption.19 
The Threat to Speech article advocates greater protection of student speech.  
While we recognize that any regulation of speech by the state20 may raise First 
Amendment concerns, we are not so quick to conclude that cyber bullying 
regulations “chill student free speech.”21  
Our analysis of the law leads us to the conclusion that school administrators have 
relatively broad discretion to regulate student speech, provided those regulations 
either serve legitimate pedagogical ends or protect the rights of other students and 
the school environment.  Indeed, as we will demonstrate below, the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s student free speech jurisprudence has followed the trend of 
granting more and more leeway to administrators.  Contrary to the claims in the 
Threat to Speech article, in our opinion that leeway clearly extends to allowing 
regulation of speech which originates off campus but has a reasonable likelihood of 
making its way on campus.  We also believe that, in addition to true threats and the 
Tinker substantial disruption standard described in the Threat to Speech article, 
school administrators may also regulate student speech consistent with the Court’s 
holding in Fraser—which set what we refer to as the “fundamental values standard” 
—and based on the fighting words doctrine. 
In order to properly analyze the current scope of constitutional protections 
surrounding student speech rights, it is important to understand the historic 
relationship between students, teachers, and administrators.  Thus, we begin our 
analysis in Section I with an overview of the history of public schools from the 
perspective of regulation of student conduct.  In Part I, we seek to provide historical 
context for regulation of student conduct by describing the state of the affairs in 
schools before Supreme Court intervention. 
                                                           
 18 John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85 (2011). 
 19 Id. at 123. 
 20 In this Article, we address only state regulation of cyber bullying in primary and 
secondary schools.  Private school regulation requires a somewhat modified analysis as 
actions by those schools are not clearly “state action” implicating the First Amendment.  Nor 
do we address post-secondary institutions, as students in colleges and universities will 
typically be over the age of eighteen, thus adding an additional layer to be considered vis-à-vis 
the First Amendment.  In addition, the history of academic freedom in post-secondary 
education is significantly different from that in primary and secondary education, and would 
take us well beyond the historical analysis we provide in Part I. 
 21 Hayward, supra note 18, at 87. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
364 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:357 
 
In Part II, we address Supreme Court school cases decided prior to the Court’s 
seminal student speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines.22  Tinker was not handed down 
in a vacuum, but is rather a point on a continuum of Supreme Court decisions 
affecting student rights.  Our aim in Part II is to give a bit of color to that continuum 
in order to put Tinker into proper perspective. 
Part III provides an analysis of Tinker and subsequent Supreme Court student 
free speech cases.  We believe that understanding the manner in which the Tinker 
standard has—and has not—been used by the Court in subsequent decisions 
provides critical guidance as to the Court’s likely view of cyber bullying regulation 
in the context of student speech rights. 
In Part IV, we synthesize the key elements of Parts I, II, and III into a coherent 
student free speech paradigm for use by school administrators and legal counsel. 
Part V then applies the paradigm to cyber bullying, and proposes two legal bases, 
in addition to “true threats” and Tinker, for the management of cyber bullying in 
public schools. 
I.  BEFORE THE COURT GOT INVOLVED 
One approach to determining whether specific conduct is constitutionally 
protected is to examine how the law has treated that conduct historically.23  For 
example, because laws punishing defamation have existed from before the time the 
Constitution was written, the Supreme Court has held that such laws do not violate 
the Constitution.24  This approach to constitutional analysis has been summarized 
thus, “A universal and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct 
creates a strong presumption that the prohibition is constitutional.”25  Applied to the 
topic at hand—student speech—if a long history of regulation of student speech 
exists, we must be very careful when we seek to alter or limit those regulations on 
constitutional grounds.  Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence in the student 
free speech case Morse v. Frederick,26 cited this principle to argue that, “the history 
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood, 
does not protect student speech in public schools.”27 
Thomas’s concurring opinion in Morse takes a strict constructionist approach to 
the Constitution.28  After explaining that in early public schools, “teachers taught and 
students listened,”29 Justice Thomas went on to cite a variety of court cases from 
                                                           
 22 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1967). 
 23 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011).  Carrigan relied on 
this principle to hold that legislative recusal requirements, “commonplace for over 200 years,” 
were constitutional.  Id. at 2351. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
 27 Id. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 28 “The belief that the interpretation of the US Constitution should be based only on 
adhering to the ‘original intent’ of those who drafted the Constitution or the amendment in 
question.”  Strict Construction(ism), THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS (3d ed. 
2009).  
 29 Morse, 551 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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different time periods—all of which dealt with issues stemming from disciplinary 
decisions in public schools.   Each of these cases illustrates that the management of 
public schools, in particular decisions around student discipline, was rarely 
challenged by the courts.  Furthermore, the rulings Justice Thomas reviewed show 
that student rights, to the extent that they existed at all, were definitely not on the 
same plane as adults’ rights.30  
Justice Thomas’s historical survey of the purpose and administration of early 
U.S. public schools has merit.  Our review of literature from earlier periods in U.S. 
public education supports Justice Thomas’s notion that schools were not outlets for 
young people to flex their constitutional rights, but rather places of learning in which 
expectations were in place for the behavior of children and where deference to 
school rules was not expected, but demanded.  Public schools were afforded great 
latitude in responding to student misconduct.  Consider the following passage from a 
treatise31 dated 1909, describing the disciplinary climate in public schools: 
The relationship between teacher and pupil on the school-grounds is very 
different from that existing between the same boy and a policeman in a 
city park or in a courthouse yard.  The teacher may arrest, try, judge and 
punish.  The policeman may only do the first.32 
This sentiment is consistent with another work, published six years later in 1915, 
describing the legal disciplinary authority of the teacher over her pupils as 
“absolute,” recognizing the teacher as “a government agent vested with authority to 
secure ends determined upon by the government,” specifically those around ensuring 
an orderly learning environment and the development of future citizens.33  As we 
will see, the role of schools in pursuing “ends determined upon by the government” 
becomes a theme of considerable prevalence in latter Supreme Court student free 
speech jurisprudence. 
Consistent with this reasoning, in 1961 an education scholar explained that 
teachers and principals stand particularly in loco parentis with regards to disciplinary 
issues, stating that school personnel “must maintain discipline, and if a pupil 
disobeys their orders, it is their duty to use reasonable means to compel compliance.” 
34  Just four years later, the Supreme Court handed down its seminal student free 
speech decision in Tinker which, from that point forward, made the Court’s 
jurisprudence a factor in defining student-teacher relations.  
As can be seen, the history of public school tradition prior to Supreme Court 
intervention was one where the idea of “student rights,” and “student free speech 
rights” in particular, was extremely limited, if it existed at all.  Taking this history 
into account, Justice Thomas’s argument in Morse takes on even greater strength; 
namely, the protection of student speech rights as “set forth in [Tinker] is without 
                                                           
 30 Id. at 411-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 31 JOHN SOGARD, PUBLIC SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS: CHAPTERS ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
OF THE SCHOOL OFFICERS, THE TEACHERS, THE PUPILS AND THE COMMUNITY 23 (1909).  
 32 Id. at 123-24. 
 33 ARTHUR C. PERRY, DISCIPLINE AS A SCHOOL PROBLEM 160 (1915).  
 34 REYNOLDS C. SEITZ, LAW AND THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL 124 (1961).  The doctrine of in 
loco parentis remains relevant to this day.  See Lorillard, supra note 17, at 262. 
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basis in the Constitution.”35   While we do not advocate abrogation of Tinker, we do 
believe that a pragmatic analysis of student speech rights, and any claims that cyber 
bullying (or other) legislation “chills student speech,” must take into account that a 
very strong argument can be made that student speech is not entitled to any first 
amendment free speech protection whatsoever.  We do not take this position—but 
we do believe that consideration of this history adds strength to the position that 
school administrators have substantial leeway in reasonably regulating student 
speech. 
We will see below that, from this initial state where student speech rights were 
non-existent, student rights began a slow evolution.  Early Supreme Court cases 
dealing with schools applied the lowest “rational basis” standard of review to 
constitutional issues, granting school administrators substantial discretion.  Over 
time, the Court expanded student rights, making them essentially coextensive with 
the constitutional rights of adults outside the schoolhouse.  But, as we shall see, in its 
most recent decisions the Court has changed direction, returning greater discretion to 
school administrators.  
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
A.  The State and Education in the 1920s 
The first Supreme Court case to address public schools in any context was the 
1923 decision of Meyer v. Nebraska.36  In Meyer, the Court addressed whether a 
Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English prior to 
eighth grade was an unconstitutional infringement on liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.37  The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional.38  In so doing, 
the Court recognized that, 
The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make 
reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they 
shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.  Nor has challenge 
been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions 
which it supports. . . .  We are constrained to conclude that the statute as 
applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the 
competency of the State.39  
Thus, in Meyer, the Court for the first time squarely addressed the state’s interest 
in educating its citizens balanced against fundamental constitutional protections, and 
it held that the appropriate level of scrutiny was the lowest, rational basis test.40   
While this was not a free speech case, it does provide perspective on the view the 
Court took of the power of the state to regulate school related activity versus the 
                                                           
 35 Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 36 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 37 Id. at 396. 
 38 Id. at 403. 
 39 Id. at 402. 
 40 See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923) (holding the same as Meyer, its 
companion case). 
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rights of students and parents.  Here, the issue in question was the power of the state 
in the critical area of defining curriculum.  And, the Court held that the state need 
only show a rational relationship between a regulation and a legitimate state interest 
to avoid running afoul of the Constitution. 
The Court next addressed primary/secondary education in Pierce v Society of 
Sisters.41  The Oregon Compulsory Education Act, effective September 1926, 
required that all children attend public schools.42  After again recognizing the power 
of the state to regulate schools, the Court again applied a rational basis test to find 
the statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.43 
Thus, the Court’s first two decisions dealing with schools are instructive with 
regard to the perceived role of the state in the process of education.  Both cases 
recognized the state’s interest in regulating education.  Both cases applied the 
generous “rational basis” test to determine whether state action in regulating 
education was constitutional.  
B.  Student Speech and the State in the 1940s 
In the 1940s, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis44 and the decision that abrogated 
it, West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette,45 first brought the issue of free 
speech in public schools before the Court.  In Minersville, the Court addressed 
whether a statute requiring that students salute the American flag was 
constitutional.46  The Gobitis children argued that saluting the flag was contrary to 
their religious beliefs and therefore unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.47  A unanimous Court held that the religious rights guaranteed under 
the Constitution did not require that the statute be held unconstitutional, so long as 
the right to believe, assemble, and worship as one chose was not affected.48  In so 
concluding, the Court once again applied a rational basis test, finding the ends of the 
legislation in question “legitimate.”49  
Less than three years later, however, we mark a major turning point in the 
Court’s treatment of student rights.  In Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, the 
Court again addressed the constitutionality of a state statute requiring salute to the 
flag.50  The Court essentially revisited the identical issue raised in Gobitis.  In 
Barnette, however, the statute was challenged on several additional constitutional 
grounds, including freedom of speech.51  The Court explained that the act of saluting 
                                                           
 41 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 42 Id. at 530. 
 43 Id. at 536. 
 44 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 45 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 46 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600. 
 47 Id. at 592. 
 48 Id. at 600. 
 49 Id. at 599. 
 50 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626. 
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the flag was clearly speech, and that the converse, the refusal to salute, also 
constituted expression of a belief or idea.52  
Finding that the statute implicated “speech,” the Court applied the “clear and 
present danger test,” and found the statute unconstitutional. 53  The clear and present 
danger test was the standard then applicable to free speech of this kind.54  Thus, the 
Court applied the same standard to student speech as applied to adult speech outside 
the schoolhouse.55  Under the rule in Barnette, students in public schools had the 
same free speech rights as adults in other contexts.56 
It is worthy of note that in reaching its decision, the Court pointed out that  
the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not 
interfere with or deny rights of others to do so.  Nor is there any question 
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly.57 
As we shall see below, this focus on interference with the rights of others and 
maintaining order in school would become and remain a key concept in the Court’s 
student free speech jurisprudence.58 
C.  Buttons and Armbands 
The Barnette flag saluting decision was handed down in 1943.59  The Court 
issued no student free speech decisions in the 1950s.  However, in 1951, the Court 
changed the free speech (not student speech) landscape with its decision in Dennis v. 
                                                           
 51 Id. at 630.  Interestingly, one of the complaints referenced in the opinion was that the 
then-popular “Bellamy Salute” was too much like Nazi salute.  Id. at 628 n.3; see also 
Children Saluting the American Flag with the Bellamy Salute in 1941, or as its Unofficial 
Nickname, the Nazi Salute, PHOTOS OF WAR (Sep. 28, 2012), http://photosofwar.net/history-
pictures-world-war-images/children-saluting-the-american-flag-with-the-bellamy-salute-in-
1941-or-as-its-unofficial-nickname-the-nazi-salute/.  The Bellamy Salute was abandoned, 
replaced by the now common right hand-over-the-heart, as mandated by Congress.  Act of 
June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 623, ch. 435, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380, H.R.J. Res. 303, 77th Cong. 
(1942) (enacted). 
 52 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 The “clear and present danger” test was first articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  The Court applied the test well into the 1940s.  See 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).  The 
test was reformulated by the Court into a balancing test in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951). 
 56 James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1347-48 
(2000) (stating that, in Barnette, “[t]he Court . . . refused to view the rights of students as 
somehow different or separate from the rights of citizens in general”). 
 57 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
 58 See infra Part III.A; see also Lorillard, supra note 17, at 204 (pointing out that collision 
of rights concept from Barnette would reappear in the Court’s jurisprudence). 
 59 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. 
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United States.60  In Dennis, the Supreme Court abandoned the clear and present 
danger test for free speech cases.  The Court replaced it with a balancing test, that 
test being: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger."61  
Thus, in dealing with student speech cases, lower courts now had two potential 
paths to follow: (1) apply the clear and present danger test, consistent with student 
free speech precedent as represented by Barnette; or (2) logically, extend the Court’s 
application of the Dennis balancing test to student free speech.  It was the application 
of the Dennis balancing test by lower courts that led to a conflict in the circuit courts, 
which in turn would result in the Supreme Court’s seminal pronouncement on 
student free speech—seminal in that it distinguished free speech rights in schools 
from those in other contexts.  Both lower court decisions involved forms of political 
protest in public schools – one political buttons, the other armbands. 
1.  Political Buttons 
The Fifth Circuit dealt with student free speech in the related cases of Burnside v. 
Byars62 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County.63  Both cases involved challenges to the 
prohibition of students wearing political buttons to school.64  Of the two, Burnside 
was decided first. 
In September 1964, students at Booker T. Washington High School in 
Mississippi began wearing buttons bearing the words “One Man, One Vote” on their 
perimeter surrounding the letters “SNCC” which stood for the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee—a non-violent Civil Rights protest group.65  Upon learning 
of this, the school principal banned the buttons, despite the fact that they were worn 
peaceably and created no disruption in the school day.66  Several children who wore 
the buttons after the ban was imposed were suspended from school, and brought suit 
alleging violation of their right to free speech.67  The district court found no violation 
of the students’ free speech rights, and the students appealed to the Fifth Circuit.68 
                                                           
 60 Dennis, 341 U.S. 494. 
 61 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 62 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 63 Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 64 Burnside, 363 F.2d at 747; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751.  An image of the Burnside 
buttons can be found at: Student Skype with History: Tinker v. Des Moines to Trayvon Martin, 
MCCOMB LEGACIES NEWS & UPDATES (May 17, 2012), available at 
http://mccomblegacies.org/blog/2012/05/students-skype-with-history-tinker-v-des-moines-to-
trayvon-martin/. The Blackwell button can be found at:  
http://www.crmvet.org/tim/tim65b.htm.  
 65 Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746. 
 66 Id. at 747. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 746. 
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The court of appeals in Burnside reviewed the prohibition of political buttons in 
school under the Supreme Court’s free speech standard as articulated in Dennis.69 
The “evil” to be regulated in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was disruption to the 
maintenance of an orderly program of classroom learning.70  Because the wearing of 
buttons did not actually disturb the decorum of the classroom, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the prohibition of the buttons by the school violated the students’ first 
amendment right to free speech.71 
In the related decision of Blackwell v. Issaquena County, the Fifth Circuit 
considered a case that was virtually identical to Burnside factually, with one critical 
exception.  In Blackwell, there was evidence of multiple instances of disruption of 
school activities as a result of buttons being brought to school.72  The Fifth Circuit 
applied the same analysis as in Burnside.  However, because in Blackwell there was 
evidence that the wearing of buttons had in fact caused a disruption at the school, the 
court held that the prohibition did not violate student free speech rights.73 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit, applying Dennis v. United States to student speech, 
measured the regulation of student free speech rights by the same standard as the 
rights of all other citizens.  In both cases, the court weighed the state’s interest in 
maintaining an appropriate academic learning environment against student free 
speech rights.  In one case it found that no disruption had occurred, and held the 
regulation unconstitutional.  In the second case, as disruptions did in fact occur, the 
regulation was held appropriate and constitutional. 
But, it could be argued that in either of these two cases school officials could 
have “anticipated” a disruption to the school environment.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
decisions were not based on an anticipation of disruption, but on a post hoc analysis 
that found actual disruption in one case, and no disruption in the other.  Is an actual 
disturbance required in order for schools to constitutionally regulate speech?  This is 
the question that was implicitly addressed and answered by the district court in 
Tinker. 
2.  Armbands 
Tinker v. Des Moines74 is the student speech case that was ultimately heard by the 
United States Supreme Court and set the standard for the regulation of student 
speech in public schools.  Like the Fifth Circuit cases of Burnside and Blackwell that 
preceded it, Tinker involved political speech by students. 
In Tinker, the speech in question involved the wearing of black armbands to 
protest the Vietnam War.75  School officials learned of a student plan to wear the 
armbands, and promulgated a regulation prohibiting the wearing of armbands on 
                                                           
 69 Id. at 748. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 749. 
 72 Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 73 Id. at 754. 
 74 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966), 
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 75 Id. 
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school grounds.  Despite notification of the regulation, the students wore the 
armbands, and were suspended as a result.76 
The procedural history of Tinker in the lower courts is interesting on several 
levels, the first being the brevity of analysis of the legal issue in question.  The 
substance of the district court opinion is barely two pages in length.77  On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed en banc, without opinion.78 
In addition to brevity, it is of interest to note that the decision by the district court 
was handed down after Burnside and Blackwell.  In fact, the district court recognized 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding in its opinion, and explicitly chose not to follow it.79  
Though the district court was under no obligation to follow Burnside and Blackwell, 
factually, Tinker and the Fifth Circuit cases are analogous.  Like the Fifth Circuit, the 
district court in Tinker applied the Dennis v. United States free speech standard.80  
And, like the Fifth Circuit, the district court focused on the state’s interest in 
maintaining an appropriate educational environment as weighed against the students’ 
free speech rights.81  Where the decisions differ is on the question of actual versus 
anticipated disruption.  The Fifth Circuit’s holdings in Burnside and Blackwell were 
different because the court based its decision on the fact that in one case disruption 
of the school environment had occurred, while in the other it had not.  The district 
court in Tinker opined that actual disruption should not be the standard, but rather: 
School officials must be given a wide discretion and if, under the 
circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably to be 
anticipated, actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent such a 
disruption must be upheld by the Court. 82 
Thus, the district court’s decision was that reasonable anticipation of disruption 
of the school environment was sufficient to allow for regulation of otherwise 
protected speech.  
Once the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, en banc and 
without opinion as stated above, the Supreme Court was faced with a conflict in the 
circuits.  The Fifth Circuit required a showing of actual disruption of the school 
environment in order to regulate student speech.  The Eighth Circuit allowed 
regulation if such actions were reasonably calculated to prevent a disruption.  
III.  TINKER AND PROGENY 
The brief history provided thus far helps us to place the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tinker, which we analyze below, in context.  The earliest Supreme Court 
cases involving public schools gave administrators substantial latitude, and applied a 
                                                           
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. at 972-73. 
 78 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 
503 (1969). 
 79 Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 973. 
 80 Id. at 972. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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rational basis test to regulations affecting schools.  This treatment was consistent 
with the historical relationship between students and administrators in U.S. public 
schools, a history which we have seen gave administrators substantial control over 
students.  The first flag saluting case—Gobitis—maintained this tack, allowing 
regulation of student speech in the interests of pedagogy. 
As noted above, the Court reversed this direction just three years later. In 
abrogating Gobitis, the Court addressed virtually identical facts, but held that student 
speech rights were subject to the same standard as the speech rights of all other 
categories of citizens in all other contexts.  This holding is remarkable when one 
considers that the Court essentially held that the free speech rights of a first grader in 
her public school classroom are the same as those of any other citizen.  This 
expansive view of the free speech rights of school children was revisited by the 
Supreme Court in Tinker. 
A.  Tinker v. Des Moines 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court pared back its expansive interpretation of student 
free speech rights.  It did so in several ways.  First, after a short paragraph defining 
the wearing of armbands as “speech,” the Court began its discussion by stating that 
First amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.  It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.83  
Although the more often quoted line from Tinker is the second sentence, we shall 
see that it is the qualifying language regarding the “special characteristics of the 
school environment” that has dominated the Court’s subsequent schoolhouse 
jurisprudence. 
A second paring back of student rights is found in the wording of the Tinker 
standard, a standard that has been called the touchstone for all cases dealing with 
student free speech rights.84  The Court’s key language is worth quoting in full: 
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours.  
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus 
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and without 
colliding with the rights of others.  Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749. But 
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -- 
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior -- materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.  Cf. Blackwell v. Issaquena County 
Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1966).85 
                                                           
 83 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 84 Hayward, supra note 18, at 104. 
 85 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
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Applying this standard, the Court found that banning students from wearing 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War was unconstitutional.86  
This standard is called the “substantial disruption test.”  This, however, is a 
misnomer at least in part—the standard is not only about disruption of the school 
environment.  In articulating the Tinker standard, the Court twice mentions 
interference with the rights of others.  While the Court cites both Blackwell and 
Burnside in support of this standard, each of those cases focused only on the 
disruption of a school environment component of the test.  Likewise, the district 
court in Tinker analyzed the case only in light of the need to maintain “a scholarly, 
disciplined atmosphere within the classroom.”87  Although not cited by the Supreme 
Court, it is the Court’s prior precedent in Barnette—the second flag saluting case—
which forms the basis for this standard, and includes two elements: disruption of the 
environment or interference with the rights of others.88  Recall Barnette: 
the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not 
interfere with or deny rights of others to do so.  Nor is there any question 
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly.89 
Thus, under Tinker, the Court protected student speech only if it does not: (1) 
disrupt the classroom; or (2) invade the rights of others.90  
Finally, the Court pared back student speech rights in the manner in which it 
applied the new student free speech standard to the facts.  In articulating the test, the 
Court speaks of actual disruption, which is the standard applied in Burnside and 
                                                           
 86 Id. at 514. 
 87 Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 972. 
 88 Lorillard, supra note 17, at 209-10 (pointing out that although standard is clearly 
disjunctive, courts seldom apply second prong alone). 
 89 Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). 
 90 See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122-23 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 
1169 (9th Cir. 2006)) (conducting “rights of others” analysis under Tinker to uphold ban on t-
shirt attacking homosexuality), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007), remanded, 485 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2007).  A number of legal scholars advocate use of Tinker’s second “rights of 
others” prong to address cyber bullying.  See Joe Dryden, School Authority Over Off-Campus 
Student Expression in the Electronic Age: Finding a Balance Between a Student's 
Constitutional Right to Free Speech and the Interest of Schools in Protecting School Personnel 
and Other Students from Cyberbullying, Defamation, and Abuse 151 (Dec. 2010) 
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of North Texas) (on file with UNT Digital 
Library) (“Through the full application of Tinker's first and second prongs an appropriate 
balance can be achieved between a student's constitutional right to free speech and the 
interests of schools in protecting school personnel and other students from cyber bullying, 
defamation, and abuse.”); Martha McCarthy, Student Expression that Collides with the Rights 
of Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 ED. L. REP. 1, 1 (2009) 
(“Courts should give more credence to Tinker's second prong.”); Matthew I. Shiffhauer, 
Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School 
Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 731, 763 
(2010) (“Tinker's ‘rights of others prong’ can provide the necessary middle-ground and 
prevent courts from rendering the ‘substantial disruption’ prong meaningless.”). 
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Blackwell.  Yet, in applying the standard and reversing the district court, the Court 
speaks repeatedly of anticipation or foreseeability of disruption, stating: 
[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that 
the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the 
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students.91  Even an official 
memorandum prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the 
ban on wearing the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of 
such disruption. . . .92 
Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least 
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial 
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally 
permissible. . . .93 
[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have 
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities. . . .94 
Thus, the outcome of Tinker is that school administrators may regulate student 
speech if the regulation aims at preventing a foreseeable: (1) material or substantial 
disruption in the school environment; or (2) invasion of the rights of others.95  
Anticipation of a disruption or of an invasion of the rights of another is sufficient to 
allow administrators to act.96  The Court left much to administrator’s discretion.  
B.  Bethel v. Fraser 
The next case to bring the issue of student speech before the Supreme Court was 
the 1986 decision of Bethel v. Fraser.97  Fraser involved an allegedly vulgar and 
offensive speech98 given by a student that the school found to violate a school 
                                                           
 91 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 92 Id. (emphasis added). 
 93 Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
 94 Id. at 514 (emphasis added). 
 95 See Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(stating that schools may regulate speech under Tinker if they reasonably believe “that speech 
will cause actual, material disruption”). 
 96 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. 
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 97 See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 675 (1986). 
 98 Justice Brennan’s concurrence sets out the speech in full: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.  Jeff 
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, 
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.  Jeff is a man who will go to the very 
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.  So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. 
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be. 
Id. at 687. 
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regulation against obscene and profane language and gestures.99  The student was 
suspended, and brought suit alleging violation of his right to free speech.100  
Applying the Tinker standard, both the district court and the court of appeals found 
that the student’s free speech rights were violated by the punishment.101  The 
Supreme Court reversed.102 
In Fraser, the Court relied on two considerations in reaching its decision.  The 
first was the function of the public schools—to “prepare pupils for citizenship in the 
Republic. . . .  It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation.”103 
The second consideration was the “sensibilities of Fraser’s fellow students.”104  
In this regard, the Court recognized the “obvious concern on the part of parents, and 
school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children -- especially in a captive 
audience -- from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”105  This 
second consideration is strikingly similar to the allowance under Tinker for 
regulation of student speech when it “collides with the rights of others.”106  Based on 
these two considerations, the Court found the suspension was an acceptable response 
to Fraser’s speech.107 
The Court also distinguished Tinker, pointing out that the speech involved in 
Fraser was not political speech.108  And, most importantly, the Court clarified the 
fact that Tinker limited the free speech rights of students, emphasizing that those 
rights were not coextensive with the free speech rights of adults in other contexts: 
[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.  As 
cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First Amendment gives a 
high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not 
Cohen's jacket.”109 
Summing all these arguments in one sentence, the Court stated, “The undoubted 
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms 
must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,” which the Court also referred to as 
                                                           
 99 Id. at 678. 
 100 Id. at 679. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 687. 
 103 Id. at 681. 
 104 Id. at 682. 
 105 Id. at 684. 
 106 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1967). 
 107 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 687. 
 108 Id. at 680. 
 109 Id. at 682-83 (citing Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (concurring in result). 
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“fundamental values.”110  As we shall argue below, the regulation of speech under 
Fraser’s “fundamental values standard” is one tool available to administrators in 
protecting victims of cyber bullying.111 
C.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Two years after Fraser, the Court again addressed student speech in 
Kuhlmeier,112 which involved an issue arguably at the heart of free speech—the 
publication of a newspaper.  In this case, it was a high school newspaper.  The 
principal of Hazelwood East High School refused to publish two articles, written by 
students—one concerning three students’ experience with pregnancy, the other about 
divorce.113  The students brought suit alleging violation of their right to free 
speech.114  The Eighth Circuit applied Tinker and found for the students, as there was 
“no evidence in the record that the principal could have reasonably forecast that the 
censored articles or any materials in the censored articles would have materially 
disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the school.”115 
The Supreme Court refused to apply the Tinker analysis to Kuhlmeier.  Rather, 
the Court distinguished the question of whether a school must tolerate student speech 
due to free speech concerns (Tinker) from the question of whether the First 
Amendment requires schools to affirmatively promote particular speech by 
students.116  It held that activities falling under this second category, such as a school 
newspaper, a school theatrical production, etc. which are activities bearing the 
imprimatur of the school, may be regulated so long as the school’s “actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”117  Again, the Court applied 
a rational basis test to the school environment. 
The Court directly quoted from Fraser regarding student rights in schools not 
being coextensive with adult rights.118  Moreover, the Court characterized Fraser as 
                                                           
 110 Id. at 681.  As the Court stated in full:  
These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic 
society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, 
even when the views expressed may be unpopular.  But these “fundamental values” 
must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case 
of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.  The undoubted freedom to advocate 
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced 
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior.  Even the most heated political discourse in a 
democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other 
participants and audiences. 
 111 See infra Part V. 
 112 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 113 Id. at 263. 
 114 Id. at 264. 
 115 Id. at 265. 
 116 Id. at 270-71. 
 117 Id. at 273. 
 118 Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
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standing for the proposition that “the school was entitled to ‘disassociate itself’ from 
the speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is 
“wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”119  
Thus, to the extent that the student speech involved may be perceived as bearing the 
imprimatur of the school, the rational basis test applies to school regulations.120 
D.  Morse v. Frederick 
The most recent Supreme Court decision on student speech was handed down in 
2007.121  Morse involved suit brought by a high school student who was suspended 
for orchestrating the unfurling of a banner at a school-sponsored event.122  The 
banner bore the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”123  The case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court from a decision by the Ninth Circuit which, applying Tinker, found 
that the student’s speech could not be regulated because it did not create a risk of 
substantial disruption.124 
The Court began by conducting an analysis of its prior student free speech 
precedent, from which it drew two key principles: (1) the “rights of students in 
public school are not coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings;” and (2) 
“Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student free speech.”125  The Court 
emphasized that the nature of the rights of students should be “what is appropriate 
for children in school.”126 
Given the foregoing premises, the Court framed the issue in Morse as “whether a 
principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a 
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”127  In analyzing the issue, the Court reviewed statistics regarding student drug 
abuse, Congressional action aimed at drug abuse prevention, and school board 
policies across the nation aimed at conveying to students the message that using 
illegal drug use is harmful.128  The Court noted the peer pressure aspect of drug 
abuse, and that “students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school 
appear to tolerate such behavior.”129  Based on the state’s important interest in 
preventing drug abuse in youths, the Court held that school regulation of student 
speech at a school event, “when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting 
illegal drug use” is acceptable.130 
                                                           
 119 Id. at 266-67. 
 120 Id. at 273. 
 121 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 122 Id. at 396. 
 123 Id. at 396-97. 
 124 Id. at 399. 
 125 Id. at 404-05. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 403. 
 128 Id. at 407-08. 
 129 Id. at 408. 
 130 Id. at 410. 
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IV.  THE CURRENT STATE OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
As we have seen, prior to the Supreme Court’s entry into the arena of public 
schools, administrators had practically carte blanche discretion in educating and 
disciplining students.  And, as Justice Thomas argued, there is no evidence that the 
Framers were thinking of the rights of children in public schools when they drafted 
the First Amendment.131  Thus, protection of student free speech, from a strict 
construction perspective, is likely unjustifiable. 
That said, it is a practical fact that the adult citizens of tomorrow are the students 
of today.  And an understanding of the concept of free speech, as well as evolution 
of the habits of minds that devolve from this freedom and the zealous debate it 
protects, cannot be granted to students whole cloth upon graduation.  An 
appreciation for the freedom to express one’s opinion, and the growth in terms of 
personal opinions and character that it fosters, must be introduced to students over 
time, and in an age appropriate manner.132  This is a process that is primarily, though 
not exclusively, the province of schools.  
Yet, while we may entrust this process to schools, history has taught us that we 
should not do so blindly.  Just as schools have historically been given broad 
discretion in forming children into responsible citizens, history also teaches that 
nowhere are citizens more vulnerable to indoctrination. In schools, they are not only 
a captive audience, but of tender age when values, and prejudices, can be inculcated 
to greatest benefit—or harm.133  Thus, while the Framers may not have had students 
in mind when they defined the protections of free speech, the practical reality is that 
such protections must begin somewhere.  And, the Court’s jurisprudence has—by 
fits and starts to be sure—circumscribed practical limits to what the state can and 
cannot do. 
As we have seen, at the outset, there was simply no protection of student speech. 
From “protecting nothing,” the Court moved to “protecting everything.”  The high 
point in the protection of student speech came at the start—when the Court 
abrogated Gobitis and for the first time recognized student free speech rights in 
public schools.  In that case—Barnette—the Court made the free speech rights of 
students in public schools co-extensive with those of adults in any other context.  
While this may be ideal, such broad protection is inconsistent both with the practical 
realities of the ages of children in schools and schools’ obligations “to inculcate 
habits and manners of civility.”134  From that point forward, the Court has engaged in 
a slow retreat from this broad protection of student speech.  
                                                           
 131 Id. at 410-11. 
 132 Algeria Ford, Chalk Talk—School Liability: Holding Middle Schools Liable for Cyber-
Bullying Despite Their Implementation of Internet Usage Contracts, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 535, 
536-37 (2009) (citing Satariano v. Sleight, 129 P.2d 35, 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)) 
(discussing that schools owe an obligation to maintain children safe, and must exercise degree 
of acre commensurate with the immaturity of their charges). 
 133 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1967) (“In our 
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate.  They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that 
are officially approved.”). 
 134 Vernonia Sch. Dist 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (citing Bethel v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). 
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In Tinker, the Court articulated essentially the same standard as Barnette’s— 
protection of the school environment and of the rights of others—but clearly stated 
that student speech rights must be considered “in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment,”135 essentially taking into account the ages of children in 
schools and school’s obligations “to inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”136  
The Court’s application of the substantial disruption standard further weakened 
“student rights” by making it clear that anticipated disruption was sufficient to 
justify state action.  Subsequent student speech cases have further reduced the scope 
of protected student speech—Fraser removed obscene and lewd speech from 
protection and introduced the notion of inculcation of “fundamental values;” 
Kuhlmeier eliminated speech bearing the imprimatur of the school from protection; 
Morse further allowed restriction of speech at any school event (regardless whether 
it might bear the imprimatur of the school) if that speech promotes illegal drug use.  
With each case it has heard, the Court has reduced the scope of protected student 
speech. 
Yet, the Court and commentators have warned against an approach to free speech 
analysis that declares new areas of speech “unprotected” based upon “an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”137  How do we, and more importantly 
school administrators, measure what is constitutionally acceptable regulation of 
student speech?  The Supreme Court’s most recent student free speech case provides 
two key points of departure: (1) the “rights of students in public school are not 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings;” and (2) “Tinker is not the 
only basis for restricting student free speech.”138  Parting from this basis, the Court 
in Morse found that school administrators may constitutionally regulate student 
speech that encourages illegal drug use. 
Given our analysis of Supreme Court cases above, we extract the following 
paradigm to guide school administrators in the area of student free speech: 
(1) Free speech rights of students should be “what is appropriate for 
children in school.”139  The “rights of students in public school are not 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”140  This means not 
only that children are to be treated differently from adults, but that 
children of different ages should be treated in a manner which is age-
appropriate.141  In other words, when it comes to free speech, schools are 
different from other contexts. 
(2) Student speech that may substantially disrupt the school environment 
or invade the rights of others may be prohibited.  Tinker’s substantial 
                                                           
 135 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 136 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 137 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
 138 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Posner, J.) (pointing out the difference between adult debates on social issues versus debates 
among children). 
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disruption test provides one of several bases for regulating student 
speech.142  School administrators may regulate student speech if the 
regulation aims at preventing a foreseeable:143 (a) material or substantial 
disruption in the school environment; or (b) invasion of the rights of 
others.144 
(3) School administrators may regulate student speech in order to protect 
the educational environment and the inculcation of fundamental values.145  
School administrators also have the power—beyond Tinker—to regulate 
student speech.146  They have “the power and indeed the duty to inculcate 
the habits and manners of civility.”147  This includes taking reasonable 
steps to protect the educational environment and process.  
V.  FREE SPEECH AND CYBER BULLYING 
The Supreme Court has yet to review a cyber bullying case.  As the Threat to 
Speech article correctly asserts, the courts that have dealt with student bullying or 
cyber bullying and free speech claims can be divided into essentially two primary 
lines of analysis.148  In situations where the conduct in question involved aggressive 
language and threats of violence, the courts have applied the “true threats” doctrine, 
which holds that threatening words are not protected speech.149  In cases where no 
                                                           
 142 Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05. 
 143 “School officials have an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of 
disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first place.”  Lowery v. Euverard, 497 
F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing LaVine ex rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 
981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption 
actually occurs before they may act.”)). 
 144 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that 
school may regulate speech under Tinker if it reasonably believes “that speech will cause 
actual, material disruption”). 
 145 We are not the first to focus on the Court’s “inculcation of values” approach to 
education.  See, e.g., Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as 
Conceptual Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1991) (“The Supreme Court 
currently views the work of the schools to be the inculcation of values.”).  See generally C. 
Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the 
Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 381-84 (1989); Anne Proffitt Dupre, 
Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 49, 85-86 (1996); William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The 
Supreme Court’s Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 973-78 (1987). 
 146 Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05. 
 147 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). 
 148 Hayward, supra note 18, at 111-17. 
 149 D.J.M. ex rel. D. M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764-65 (8th Cir. 
2011) (stating that student’s instant messages outside of school, which threatened killing of 
ex-girlfriend and others, constituted true threats); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 
(2d Cir. 2007) (stating that school official’s authority to regulate student speech is much 
broader than the bounds of the true threats doctrine); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868-69 (Pa. 2002) (applying true threats doctrine to cyber bullying 
YouTube video); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 425-26 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding that 
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true threat was alleged or found to exist, courts have applied Tinker and analyzed the 
speech to determine if there was a substantial disruption to the school environment, 
an imposition on the rights of others, or both.150  
Thus, in dealing with cyber bullying, as a general rule courts will apply either the 
true threats doctrine or Tinker.151  Both of these approaches clearly have merit. On 
this point, we agree with the Threat to Speech article. 
We disagree with Hayward, however, regarding the degree of discretion 
administrators have over student speech which originates off campus.152  In addition, 
we believe that two other approaches—beyond true threats and Tinker—consistent 
with our three-part paradigm above, are available to schools dealing with cyber 
bullying: the Fraser fundamental values standard, and the fighting words doctrine.  
These approaches, we believe, address a gap between the true threats doctrine and 
Tinker – a gap into which much cyber bullying conduct falls. 
                                                           
posting on a non-school website was a true threat and therefore not protected speech under the 
First Amendment); see also Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624-26 
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that non-internet letter threatening another student written outside of 
school was found a true threat and sufficient to support expulsion of authoring student).  See 
generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (establishing parameters of the true 
threats doctrine); Lorillard, supra note 17, at 198.   
 150 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
MySpace page created by senior in high school attacking another student was potentially 
disruptive under Tinker); D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 765 (finding student’s instant messages outside 
of school, which threatened killing of ex-girlfriend and others, constituted foreseeable 
substantial disruption under Tinker); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding that a student who posted vulgar, deceptive message about cancellation of school 
event on blog (off campus) could be punished by school under Tinker due to potential 
substantial disruption on campus); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (applying Tinker to find 
eighth grader’s instant messaging of icon depicting shooting of teacher was not protected 
constitutionally); R.S. ex rel. S.S v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126257 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding that a sixth grader’s posting that 
she “hated” a school employee on Facebook wall, outside of school hours and inaccessible 
from school, was not likely to cause substantial disruption under Tinker); Evans v. Bayer, 684 
F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that a Facebook group created off campus 
criticizing teacher did not rise to level of potential disruption sufficient to satisfy Tinker); J.S., 
807 A.2d at 868-69 (finding that a student speech created off campus, and posted on website, 
that included derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening statements directed toward one 
of the student's teachers and his principal could be punished under Fraser as lewd and under 
Tinker). 
 151 But see Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School 
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 
171, 203-10 (2012) (Can.) (proposing additional legal standards courts should consider in 
dealing with cyber bullying including sexual harassment and the affirmative duty to respond, 
the employee speech standard and defamation, and regulating impact, not content). 
 152 Hayward argues that “[w]hile campus speech is governed under the Tinker tetralogy, the 
extent to which school officials can regulate off-campus speech is unclear.”  Hayward, supra 
note 18, at 108. 
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A.  Off-Campus Speech 
Given the fact that cyber bullying involves the use of electronic media, it is not 
uncommon for cyber bullying speech to originate off campus.  What then is the 
authority of administrators to deal with this speech? 
While the Threat to Speech article argues that the courts are in disarray regarding 
the application of Tinker to speech that originated off campus,153 two clear lines of 
cases exist in this regard.154  There are those cases, comprising the majority, which 
apply Tinker, regardless of whether the speech originated on or off campus.155  This 
line of cases holds that, so long as there is an actual or potential substantial 
disruption on campus, the Tinker standard is satisfied.156 
The second line of cases, which is a small minority, seeks to establish a sufficient 
“nexus” between off campus speech and the school campus before applying 
Tinker.157  Generally, these cases hold that if it is reasonably foreseeable that off 
campus speech will make its way on campus, the nexus standard is met and Tinker 
applies.158 
There is arguably a third category of cases involving situations in which students 
engage in off campus speech and go to extraordinary but ultimately unsuccessful 
lengths to keep that speech from reaching campus.  Only one case we have found 
                                                           
 153 Id. at 108-10. 
 154 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills provides an exhaustive analysis of court decisions 
addressing this issue.  J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 
1094, 1102-08 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
 155 See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(applying Tinker to student-published underground newspaper which made its way onto 
campus); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) 
(applying Tinker to derogatory top-ten list distributed off campus and via email which was 
brought to campus by one recipient); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 
1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding Tinker applied to website created off campus containing 
mock obituaries of students); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying Tinker where website created off campus 
containing criticism of school officials was accessed by student at school); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., 
No. CV 08-5671 ODW, 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker 
to student disciplined for video created off campus and posted to internet that depicted murder 
of a teacher); Pangle ex rel. Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 285-86 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2000) (applying Tinker to student-written underground newspaper disseminated on 
campus). 
 156 See cases cited supra note 155. 
 157 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 
F.3d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 
865 (Pa. 2002). 
 158 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40; see also Laura Pavlik Raatjes, 
School Discipline of Cyber-Bullies: A Proposed Threshold That Respects Constitutional 
Rights, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2011) (stating that most courts will apply Tinker if 
it is likely that disruption will occur on campus). 
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addressed this fact situation, which is clearly an exceptional circumstance.159  In that 
situation, the court found that Tinker did not apply.160 
To be clear, so long as there is a reasonable potential for disruption of the school 
environment, no court has refused to apply Tinker.  This is hardly a state of disarray.  
Yet, even in cases where Tinker might be inapplicable, we believe two additional 
legal theories can be constitutionally applied by administrators to deal with cyber 
bullying. 
B.  The Fraser Fundamental Values Standard 
Fraser was the first student free speech first case decided by the Court after 
Tinker, and notably did not apply the Tinker analysis.161  Fraser focused on the 
responsibility schools have to inculcate fundamental societal values in children as a 
justification for regulation of student speech—in the case of Fraser, vulgar speech.  
As the Court stated: 
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to 
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.  Indeed, 
the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or 
highly threatening to others. . . .  The inculcation of these values is truly 
the “work of the schools.”  The determination of what manner of speech 
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with 
the school board.162 
In summary, schools are responsible for teaching fundamental values, and 
American democratic fundamental values “disfavor the use of highly offensive or 
highly threatening” language.163  
How are schools to accomplish this task if they do not have some discretion in 
regulating student speech?  The very act of regulating student speech is a lesson to 
students with regards to what is, and what is not, acceptable dialogue in a civilized, 
democratic society.  Schools teach by regulating.  To prohibit schools from 
regulating speech would be tantamount to prohibiting schools from teaching and 
inculcating these critical fundamental values.  The Supreme Court recognized this in 
Kuhlmeier when it stated “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could 
not censor similar speech outside the school.”164 
The point bears repeating, for it is at the crux of the tension between free speech 
claims and the mission of public schools.  Schools teach what is appropriate and 
                                                           
 159 Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 160 Id.  Even in this case, the court pointed out “territoriality is not necessarily a useful 
concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”  Id. at 1058 n.13 
(Newman, J., concurring). 
 161 O'Shaughnessy, supra note 16, at 47 (noting that the Court did not apply the Tinker 
standard in Fraser). 
 162 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
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inappropriate by prohibiting conduct and speech which, though it may be 
constitutionally protected in our society when spoken outside of schools, is offensive 
and counter to the fundamental values schools seek to inculcate.  The practicality of 
this concept is obvious; the Seventh Circuit provided an excellent example, in 
applying Fraser: 
In a public forum, the Christian can tell the Jew he is going to hell, or the 
Jew can tell the Christian he is not one of God's chosen, no matter how 
that may hurt.  But it makes no sense to say that the overly zealous 
Christian or Jewish child in an elementary school can say the same thing 
to his classmate, no matter the impact.  Racist and other hateful views can 
be expressed in a public forum.  But an elementary school under its 
custodial responsibilities may restrict such speech that could crush a 
child's sense of self-worth.165 
Such statements by the Jewish or Christian child do not rise to the level of true 
threats.  And, depending on the circumstances, may not rise to the level of creating a 
substantial disruption in the school or impose on the rights of other students under 
Tinker.  But, no rational adult would argue that school administrators are prevented 
from prohibiting such speech by students—although such speech is clearly protected 
when spoken by adults outside the school context. 
Under Fraser, school administrators have broad discretion in regulating student 
speech provided the regulation is aimed at teaching the bounds of appropriate social 
behavior and inculcating fundamental values.  This is what we referred to above as 
maintaining an appropriate school climate.166  Several courts have extended Fraser’s 
application beyond school-sponsored events,167 and have applied it to hold that the 
display of confederate flags at school could be regulated,168 and that school officials 
could prohibit a student from wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts to school.169  Neither 
of these could be constitutionally prohibited off campus. 
                                                           
 165 Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 166 See supra Introduction. 
 167 See Denno ex rel. Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1274-76 
(11th Cir. 2000) (extending Fraser to non-school function activities); Chandler v. 
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending Fraser to hold school 
officials may regulate lewd, obscene, and vulgar speech even if it does not occur during a 
school sponsored event); see also J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 
847, 868-69 (Pa. 2002) (noting that student speech created off campus, and posted on website, 
that included derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening statements directed toward one 
of the student's teachers and his principal could be punished under Fraser as lewd and under 
Tinker). 
 168 Denno, 218 F.3d at 1275-76 (using Fraser precedent to bar display of confederate flag 
in school even absent potential disruption); West ex rel. T.W. v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233-34 (D. Kan. 1998) (applying Fraser to hold that drawing and 
display of confederate flag be prohibited and such conduct disciplined), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1358 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
 169 Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
under Fraser, a high school could prohibit wearing of offensive though not obscene Marilyn 
Manson t-shirt). 
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Fraser creates a more flexible reasonableness standard than Tinker that balances 
the student’s right to “advocate unpopular and controversial views against the 
school's interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.”170  We refer to this as the Fraser “fundamental values standard.”  And, at 
least one court has applied this standard to cyber bullying conduct, finding that a 
student website, created off campus, that included derogatory, profane, offensive and 
threatening statements directed toward one of the student's teachers, could be 
proscribed and punished under Fraser.171 
C.  Cyber Bullying as Fighting Words 
The First Amendment has no application when what is restricted is not 
“protected” speech.172  The Supreme Court has defined a number of categories of 
speech that are of such little value as to not be entitled to first amendment protection, 
such as inciting imminent lawless action (falsely shouting fire in a crowded 
theater),173 obscenity,174 defamation, child pornography,175 and fighting words.176  
This third category—the fighting words doctrine—is arguably applicable to cyber 
bullying.  
The Supreme Court has defined fighting words as follows: 
The test is what [a person] of common intelligence would understand 
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . .  The 
English language has a number of words and expressions which by 
general consent are “fighting words” when said without a disarming 
smile. . . .  Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within 
the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have 
this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of 
the peace.177 
The test requires an analysis of both the content of the words and the context in 
which they are used.  The test also measures the reaction of the addressee based on 
those of an objective, reasonable person.178 
                                                           
 170 Denno, 218 F.3d at 1273-74; see Lorillard, supra note 17, at 212 (citing J.S., 807 A.2d 
at 868 (finding if court solely applied Fraser, there would be “little difficulty in upholding the 
School District's discipline”)) (arguing that Fraser legal theory is best match to cyber bullying 
cases). 
 171 J.S., 807 A.2d at 868-69. 
 172 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011) (determining that 
voting of a legislator is not speech); see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) 
(holding that obscenity is not speech). 
 173 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919). 
 174 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 476. 
 175 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982). 
 176 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952). 
 177 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. 
 178 Id. 
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One state supreme court has applied this doctrine to find that bullying between 
children constituted unprotected fighting words.  In Svedberg v. Stamness,179 the 
North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a free speech challenge to the issuance of a 
restraining order against a fourteen-year-old child for harassment.  In Svedberg, the 
defendant and his friends had engaged in incessant teasing, calling Svedberg 
“Dumbo,” had constructed large snow figures with big ears around the 
neighborhood, and on one occasion the defendant stated to Svedberg, “You had 
better watch it Dumbo or I will kill you.”180  Based on this conduct, the district court 
issued a restraining order under the North Dakota Criminal Code,181 finding “that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in disorderly 
conduct.”182  The defendant challenged the issuance of the restraining order, arguing 
that his words were protected speech.183  
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the free speech challenge in light of 
the fighting words doctrine.184  In so doing, the court pointed out that, in determining 
what an objective addressee would do in the given context, it was appropriate to take 
into account the age of the addressee.185  As the court stated: 
No one would argue that a different reaction is likely if a thirteen-year-old 
boy and a seventy-five-year-old man are confronted with identical 
fighting words.  Accordingly, we hold that to determine what constitutes 
fighting words, a court must consider both the content and the context of 
the expression, including the age of the participants.186 
Based on this analysis, the court found that words in question were fighting 
words not subject to constitutional protection.187 
Were a court to apply the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying, its “context” 
analysis must take into account two important issues. 188 
First, as we are dealing with cyber bullying at the elementary and secondary 
school levels, the age of the parties involved is a factor.  Scientific studies have 
confirmed what common sense indicates, that children go through a process of 
maturation that includes development of rationality.189  The free speech rights of a 
                                                           
 179 Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994). 
 180 Id. at 679-80. 
 181 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(5)(d) (2013).  
 182 Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 679-80. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 683. 
 185 Id. at 684. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (pointing out that a statement 
made with “disarming smile” may not constitute fighting words while same expression made 
in different context may); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating analysis of content and context needed for fighting words to be found).   
 189 Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Bullies, Words, and Wounds: One State’s Approach in 
Controlling Aggressive Expression Between Children, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057, 1078 (1997) 
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senior in high school should not be the same as a second grader’s.  The courts have 
also recognized that the level of constitutional protection of free speech varies with 
the age of the students involved, and so should what constitutes fighting words.190  
Consequently, an application of the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying must 
take into account the ages of those involved. 
Secondly, in applying the fighting words doctrine to cyber bullying, we are by 
definition speaking of speech that takes place in, or imposes itself into, the public 
school, which we have seen is “fundamentally different from other contexts.”191  
Interestingly, Svedberg did not address regulation of speech in the school context, 
but rather regulation of speech by children under a criminal statute outside of school.  
If the bullying actions in Svedberg constituted fighting words outside the public 
school context, under the more flexible constitutional conditions in the public school 
context such conduct could be legitimately prohibited and/or punished in a public 
school. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to 
conscience, above all liberties.”192 ―John Milton  
Free speech rights of students are not amendable to a one-size fits all blanket 
protection.  As children grow in age and maturity, their ideas (and the speech they 
use to express those ideas) mature as well.  A second grader’s mis-directed chant of 
“four-eyes” is not entitled to the same protection as a high school senior’s silent 
protest of war by wearing a black armband.193  There is no marketplace of ideas in 
                                                           
(citing DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A 
PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS (1989)) (analyzing data on the development of rationality in 
children); Paul C. Magnusson, Student Rights and the Misuse of Psychological Knowledge 
and Language, in SCHOOLING AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 92-114 (Vernon F. Haubrich & 
Michael W. Apple eds., 1975) (reviewing courts’ use of developmental data to analyze 
children's rights). 
 190 Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 684 (citing obvious difference in reactions between a seventy-
five year old man and a teenager).  Compare Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 
667, 671 n.6 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that expelling graduate student for distributing 
newspaper containing “indecent” political speech was unconstitutional), with Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding high school could censor newspaper 
articles by students without infringing on the constitution).  See also Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. 
Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing difference between 
adult debates on social issues versus debates among children); cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 
U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (holding that trained police officer must exercise a higher degree of 
restraint than the average citizen in the face of fighting words). 
 191 See supra Part III; see also Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 
243, 267 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding public school harassment policy constitutional, though would 
not have been outside school context). 
 192 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 50 (John W. Hales ed., 1st ed. 1875). 
 193 See Dryden, supra note 90, at 167 (distinguishing between expressions about matters of 
public concern deserving of free speech protection and offensive, malicious, and defamatory 
expression); Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish 
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 283 (2008) (arguing that cyber 
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second grade, or if there is, it is very small.  Context is clearly as important as 
content when taking into account prohibitions of student speech. 
The Supreme Court’s student free speech jurisprudence recognizes that schools 
are different from other contexts, and that children are different from adults.  These 
differences are at the heart of the Court’s analysis of student speech rights.  
Consistent with these differences, the evolution of student speech rights 
demonstrates a willingness by the Court to grant greater latitude to public schools in 
regulating speech provided that regulation is aimed at appropriate pedagogical ends: 
preventing foreseeable disruption in the school environment or invasion of the rights 
of others; inculcating fundamental values; protecting the educational process.  To 
achieve these ends, we have shown that school administrators have several tools 
available to them to constitutionally regulate student speech: the true threats 
doctrine, the Tinker substantial disruption test, the Fraser fundamental values 
standard, and the fighting words doctrine.  These doctrines cover a broad spectrum 
of student speech—from outright threats, to potentially disruptive speech, to speech 
that is inappropriate to the educational environment and the fundamental values it 
seeks to inculcate. 
There is no doubt that speech that would otherwise be protected outside of the 
school context may be constitutionally regulated in public schools.  School 
administrators must grapple, daily, with where to draw the line.  When speech occurs 
on campus, or makes itself felt on campus, we believe that good faith adherence to 
three concepts will resolve most constitutional doubts: 
(1) Free speech rights of students should be “what is appropriate for 
children in school.” 
(2) Student speech that may substantially disrupt the school environment 
or invade the rights of others may be prohibited. 
(3) School administrators may regulate student speech in order to protect 
the educational environment and the inculcation of fundamental values. 
Among the many memories that most of us take from our early school days, two 
are probably common to most of us.  The first is of instances of experiencing or 
witnessing teasing or bullying behavior.  The second is of rules, regulations, 
prohibitions, and restrictions imposed by school administrators that seemed, at the 
time, excessive or unfair.  It is likely that most of us have looked back with chagrin 
on both of these memories: on memories of teasing and bullying, with regret at not 
having done more to stop them; on memories of “unfair” restrictions with a more 
understanding and mature perspective. 
If we are fortunate, most of us have not had to deal—either as children or 
adults—with the extreme consequences of bullying—student deaths.  We began this 
article memorializing children who died as a result of bullying behavior.  They were 
school children, all under the age of eighteen, who died too young.  They left behind 
moms and dads, grandparents, brothers, sisters, friends—all of whom, years from 
now, will continue to remember them.  Their smiles will be missed.  Their laughter 
will be remembered.  The promise of their amazing potential will never be realized. 
And all of the loved ones they left behind will ask themselves, repeatedly—what if? 
Could we have done more?  How could we have prevented the unbearable tragedy of 
                                                           
bullying rarely addresses matters of public concern and should not be entitled to constitutional 
protection). 
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their premature deaths?  We believe school administrators have the power, indeed 
the obligation, to do more. 
Let there be no mistake.  We believe, as Milton argued, that free speech and 
debate is the primary, fundamental, and irreplaceable liberty vital to any true 
democracy.  And we abhor any regulation by the state that infringes on this right – 
be it the right to free speech of an adult or a child.  But, we recognize that we live in 
an imperfect world, full of grey areas, and that close calls will sometimes fall on the 
wrong side of “the line.”  If school administrators from time to time err on the side 
of protecting a child victim of cyber bullying versus protecting the free speech rights 
of a bully, as adults we believe that we can live with that.  And so can the victims. 
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